Fort Necessity National Battlefield ⓘ

By the middle of the 18th century widely known and accepted practices for “modern” military fortification had been in place in Europe for nearly a century. Nearly all professional military officers were exposed in some way to what were considered the professional standards of knowledge relating to military engineering and fortification. The most influential figure during the development of the theory and practice of military engineering in the late 17th and early 18th centuries was Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban. Vauban, as Marshal of France under King Louis XIV, developed a system of attack and defense that became the standard throughout Europe. He built numerous forts and fortifications throughout France, which were quickly copied by other European powers. Vauban developed and standardized the best practices for the construction of military defenses. The pentagonal five bastioned fort, like the pictured in figure III, allowed the defenders to fire on attackers from all angles. Soon many of the larger cities of Europe, which served as supply points or magazines for operating field armies, began to construct defenses using Vauban’s system.

The strength of the defenses designed by Vauban meant that it became very difficult and costly to capture them by force. Often a long siege would be required, whereby defenders would be starved or intimidated into surrendering. Siege warfare would emerge to be the predominant form of combat in Europe throughout the first half of the 18th century.

The necessity of understanding the science of how to construct both the defenses as well as the siege works to capture them necessitated ever increasing knowledge in the military art. Engineers, those officers specifically trained in the subject, became ever more valuable to armies as dynastic wars continued to rage across Europe. Specialized officer corps and schools began to develop that trained engineers, such as the British Corps of Royal Engineers in 1720 and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwhich in 1741. Engineers became an officer most commanders would not dare to be without on campaign.

While the 22-year-old Washington was certainly no professionally trained military engineer, he was at least familiar with the basic math that went into their construction. His first job in life was a surveyor, so using a compass and theodolite were very familiar to him, as was measuring and laying out things. He was also familiar with the design and defense of fortifications. While visiting Barbados with his older half-brother Lawrence in 1751, Washington encountered one of the most heavily fortified locations in North America. Young Washington was always a keen observer, and he commented at length about the island’s defenses, especially Charles Fort . Washington also had numerous military manuals available to him. While it is unknown what or even if Washington had manuals with him on the Fort Necessity campaign it is likely that he at least had a knowledge from, or a copy of, Humphrey Bland’s Treatise of Military Discipline, the bible of the British Army . At least one of Washington’s officers had a copy of Bland with him on the 1754 campaign. Bland’s treatise contained several sections on field fortifications . Bland’s manual, like many others of the period, borrowed heavily from the engineering and fortification principles espoused by Vauban and other early visionaries.

As Washington’s little army proceeded into the wilderness in 1754, he knew he needed and was prepared to build fortifications . In fact, his main mission was to build a road and support the fort-building operations already ongoing at the Forks of the Ohio , where the city of Pittsburg stands today. His orders from Governor Dinwiddie were “You are to use all Expedition in proceeding to the Fork of Ohio with the Men under Com’d and there you are to finish and compleat in the best Manner and as soon as You possibly can, the Fort w’ch I expect is there already begun by the Ohio Comp’a” (Captain Trent). He brought with him tools, like those pictured in Figure IV, to build fortifications and blacksmiths to repair old tools and build new ones.

Both European powers understood that forts in the wilderness would not be on the grand scale of their counterparts in Europe. Their remoteness made them expensive to build and maintain, and it was very difficult and costly to resupply them. Only a small number of troops could be kept in garrison for long periods of time. The smaller the garrison, the smaller the fort. They were built to size, so that the number of defenders could man each point within. The defenses of fortifications were also designed based on the types of threats they might face. Fort’s near the coast might expect an attacker to be armed with heavy artillery, such as siege mortars or howitzers, or even to be bombarded from ships naval guns. However, fort’s in more remote wilderness areas might only face small arms or light artillery. The threats they might face also factored into what type or size of fortification would be constructed. After the arrival of the French in strength at the Forks of the Ohio on April 17th, and his own encounter with the French at Jumonville Glen on May 28th, Washington knew he would be operating out of the Great Meadows for at least several weeks . His plan was to wait and see what the French response would be, as well as to await resupply and reinforcements . He needed a secure supply point to guard his munitions and foodstuffs. He set his men to the construction of fortifications. On May 31st he wrote to his younger brother Jack “we have already got entrenchments and are about a pallisado.” On June 3rd Washington wrote to Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie “we have just finished a small pallisado fort, in which with my small numbers I shall not fear the attack of 500 men.” What Washington had decided to construct was a storehouse surrounded by a wooden palisade, or circular redoubt. A redoubt is an enclosed fortification constructed to defend a key position from attack from any direction . They were generally made from earth or logs and came in many shapes and sizes, generally built to size for the number of defenders. Circular redoubts, such as those seen in Figure V, were favored by many military engineers, especially for numerically inferior forces. It gave a 3600 field of fire and allowed a small garrison to easily cover all angles of defense. Washington’s force at the beginning of June numbered less than 140 men . This was the most logical short-term fortification given Washington’s available and meagre resources.

The Great Meadows in the 18 th century could be referred to as an oasis of grass in a desert of trees. And these were not small trees. The old growth virgin forest which surrounded the Great Meadows were giant trees, in some cases 8-10 feet in diameter, tress that had never been cut. Much like modern military principles, defensive works in the 18 th century required open space surrounding them, allowing the defenders “clear fields of fire.” This was a space to kill the enemy before they could get to you. The only area in which Washington could establish a defensive position with enough clear space to build a fortification to house 400 men and still have clear fields of fire was the largest section of the Great Meadows. This is where he had already constructed his circular stockade redoubt. Washington decided to incorporate the stockade into the larger, expanded work. Never having intended to fight at Fort Necessity, Washington was now forced to construct “field fortifications.” Field fortifications were generally hastily constructed defenses with materials that were readily available, in this case earth and wood. These were not designed to be long term fortifications, just an expedient to protect troops in the short term. The men would not live in them, simply fight from behind them when they needed to . Major Stephen recalled that not long after arriving back at the Great Meadows on July 1st “we set about clearing the woods nearest to us, and carrying in the logs, to raise a breastwork and enlarge the fort.” It is often asked “why didn’t Washington build the fort on top of the hill”, or “why didn’t he clear the trees back.” These statements display a lack of understanding of Washington’s resources and the reality of the 18th century American wilderness. The large virgin trees described above were difficult to cut down, especially by exhausted, mal-nourished men who had hand tools. Had modern engineering equipment, or even chainsaws been available to Washington and his men, then the hill which today hosts the Mount Washington Tavern may have been an excellent site. Obviously, that was not the case. Plus cutting down a tree was one thing, cutting it up and removing it another entirely. Washington understood that an upright tree protected one or two enemies, one cut down and lying on its side now provided a fighting position for many more. Washington had finite resources at his disposal, which were slipping away exponentially. These resources were not just materiel, but also consisted of his men’s strength and stamina, their psychological capacity to withstand the fatigues of labor as well as fear of attack and the unknown. His most important resource, perhaps besides the welfare of his soldiers, was time . Washington’s intelligence had informed him that the French and their American Indian allies were after him and hot on his trail. He didn’t know exactly how much time he had to prepare.

With his limited resources, the young commander set priorities of work and put his men about constructing field fortifications to protect his 400 soldiers. It must also be remembered that the entire force would not have been available to work on the defenses. 18th century armies had daily tasks they had to accomplish, and Washington’s was no different. The young commander dispersed his men in groups out conducting reconnaissance, men on picket or guard duty providing security around the camp and men in various details and working parties, such as blacksmiths and bakers . Those men who were working on the defenses constructed two “fleches”, arrowhead shaped walls, viewed in Figure VI, which together formed a semi-rectangular redoubt of earth and wood. When determining the size of the redoubt, the officers used a well-known formula for constructing defenses. Military engineering manuals instructed officers that each file of soldiers needed a pace, or about two feet of space to load, maneuver and fire their musket. In defensive positions, British soldiers in the 18th century stood in two ranks, one behind the other. That meant Washington’s men, some 400 strong, only needed 200 men of frontage. 200 men, according to the formula, would need 400 feet of wall to fight from behind. If you measure the earthworks at Fort Necessity, they are almost exactly 400 feet in length.

It is unknown who precisely supervised the construction of these defenses. Washington was certainly familiar with fortifications, and Captain MacKay was a professional officer with over twenty years of experience and had served in large forts in South Carolina and Georgia. Captain Robert Stobo later claimed to have been appointed “Regimental Engineer”, but there is no contemporary primary source evidence to support this . It is also unknown exactly how the walls were built. No specific contemporary description of their construction exists, but most likely one of the officers measured the angle of the fleches and laid out the line on which the walls, or parapet, were to be built. Then the men began by digging a ditch to serve as a trench on the interior of the line that was laid out, piling up the earth along the line itself. After digging about two feet they then dug a ditch on the exterior, again piling up the earth in the middle. JC Harrington’s 1953 archeology, seen in Figure VII, discovered the two-foot depth of the trenches. Two feet makes sense, as the water table would have been struck at that depth. The Great Meadows was an open grassy area precisely because it was a rather wet, sort of marshy place. After the parapet was constructed, logs were most likely used at certain portions along the wall, especially at the top, to hold down the earth and provide additional cover. There is some archeological evidence to support this.

Eighteenth century military engineering manuals called for earthen redoubts to be built of gabionsfascines, baskets of wood and earth formed together into a wall. If time was not available to construct gabions then fascines, bundles of sticks bound together, were to be used . The British soldiers, although most likely familiar with gabion construction, did not have the time to build such formal structures and thus resorted to readily available and easily used material, dug earth and stacked logs. It is possible fascines were used, but no primary source or archeological evidence has been discovered to prove this. That the earthworks themselves existed is strongly supported by the historical record. Washington recalled that after first forming his men in the meadow in line of battle, his army soon “retired to our trenches” and that he was concerned that the French would endeavor to “force our trenches” by “their superiority of numbers” . Private John Shaw recalled after the battle that prior to the engagement the army “had endeavored to throw up a little entrenchment round them.” The wall was most likely about four feet high, or breast high on most of the men, hence the term breastwork that Major Stephen used . The two-foot ditch on the interior of the wall gave the soldiers standing behind it about six feet of cover.

The longest section of the walls, the part which could fit the most men, faced the southeast and southwest, the direction that Washington knew the French would fight from . This was the area of the wood-line that came the closest to the fort and he had not had the time or resources to clear back farther. Those sections of the earthworks were also where Washington placed his most significant casualty producing weapons, two of his swivel guns. It was likely that the tops of the felled trees were linked together around the exterior of the earthworks to form an “abatis”, a primitive form of modern barbwire. It is unknown how the opening, or sally port, in the earthworks was secured. No archeological work has ever been done at that location. It may have been that, like most redoubts constructed during the period, a traverse, or small wall, was built on the interior of the opening to block incoming fire . Wagons or some other obstacle may also have been used to block the opening.

Although not finished when the French arrived around 11am on July 3rd, Washington’s little fort was fairly well constructed. Even the French commander Captain Louis Coulon de Villiers noted that it “was advantageously enough situated.” De Villiers knew that he could not launch a frontal assault on the redoubt without “expos[ing] the subjects of his Majesty in vain.” The experienced French commander, a veteran of several decades of wilderness service, quickly realized that this fight would be a siege. His French marine infantry, Canadian militia and American Indian allies quickly surrounded the fortification, using the tree line for cover. An all-day fight ensued, with periods of shooting interrupted by periods of rainfall, some torrential. By nightfall, Washington’s force was wet, muddy and tired. Worse, they had suffered over 100 casualties, 30 dead and some 70 wounded. The trenches were filled with water, the men were having trouble shooting back because of fouled muskets and many of them had broken into the army’s rum supply and gotten falling-down drunk. To say the young commander had a few problems is an understatement.

However, the French had problems of their own. Unbeknownst to Washington, de Villiers’s force was basically out of ammunition, low on food and were about to lose a significant portion of their force. It must be remembered that the French column had left Fort Duquesne on June 28th. It is unknown how many French soldiers and their allies were on the battlefield on July 3rd, 1754. The primary sources do not agree on the strength. Our best guess given all the accounts is around 700, approximately 500 French and Canadians and around 200 American Indians. De Villiers’s men had with them only the food and ammunition they could carry on their person. By July 3rd, having been on the march for six days, the French were running low on supplies. Regarding ammunition, the French commander noted that during the battle “the fervor and zeal of our Canadians and soldiers worried me because I could see we would soon be without ammunition” Just as troubling, de Villiers’s American Indian allies told him they were leaving the next morning. They reported British reinforcements were on the march and close by, which was not the case, and that they needed to head home. Some of the warriors of the pays d’en haut, tribes from the interior of Canada, had travelled from as far as the shores of Lake Michigan to be at the battle and were ready to return . De Villiers knew that to be victorious and accomplish his mission, he had to wrap up the engagement before his allies left. At around 8:00pm, de Villiers offered a ceasefire and generous terms for the British surrender. Washington, unaware of the French situation, was eventually convinced to sign. His reasons were many but consisted mainly of the fact that his force had suffered significant casualties and the men he had left were combat ineffective; either their weapons didn’t work, their ammunition was ruined, or they were drunk. His men were in bad shape even before the shooting started. He was very low on food, and resupply and reinforcement were nowhere to be found . Thinking he was heavily outnumbered, he made the most logical decision he could given the circumstances and the terms offered. Around midnight, Washington agreed to surrender Fort Necessity at dawn on July 4th, 1754.

The quote above was uttered by JC “Pinky” Harington, chief archeologist of the National Park Service, who was sent to Fort Necessity in the summer of 1953 to discover the truth about the fortifications size and location. For many years, since the reconstruction of the site in 1931-32, there had been a debate about the exact size, composition and location of Washington’s little fort . As constructed from 1932, a large rectangular wooden stockade wall greeted visitors to the site, as seen in figure VIII. However, all primary source accounts of Washington’s construction at the Great Meadows indicated a round structure.

The first surveys conducted of the site in the early 19th century, with the wooden stockade no longer present, seemed to indicate a rectangular shape. The French had torn down and burned the wooden portions of the fort after they captured it . What early surveyors encountered were the only visible remnants of Fort Necessity left on the surface, the outline of the eroded earthworks. Not understanding what they were looking at, they took these outlines to be the remnants of the exterior wall of the stockade itself . Limited archeology in 1931 seemed to prove the rectangular theory . Harrington, after reviewing the primary source evidence, went to work in 1953 to prove which was correct. After digging numerous test pits and trenches, he quickly became convinced that the stockade portion of the structure had been round. Expanding on this theory, he began larger excavations and quickly proved himself correct. He found the burnt off stockade posts in the ground, arranged in a circular formation approximately 53’ in diameter. Harrington had found Fort Necessity.

But what he also discovered around the stockade were the remnants of what he quickly identified as earthworks . Harrington and his workers found the remnants of the trenches that surrounded the wooden circular redoubt. From his archeology, Harrington believed that the majority of the earthwork’s parapet, or wall had been made of earth. He also discovered that the interior and exterior trenches were dug to about two feet each, the earth thus removed piled up in the middle to about the height of four feet . In one place, Harrington even found one of the logs he believed had been used to construct the earthworks (see figure X).

Hopefully this brief examination has helped you understand that the story of Fort Necessity and the battle here, as well as the accounts of its participants, is far from black and white. There is very much a shade of gray to the story. It cannot simply be posited that the 22-year-old Virginia colonel was simply a young, dumb, naive kid who didn’t know what he was doing. In fact, there is much evidence to the contrary. Unlike Washington’s trenches during the battle, the popular perception of the young commander’s decisions simply doesn’t hold water.

Upon closer examination, Washington on this campaign generally made logical decisions based on the conditions confronting him and his available resources. That he was inexperienced and to a certain extent unprepared for his first command is not really debatable. But, given the conditions and circumstances Washington faced, would another British officer have fared much better? There were more than a few regular British Army colonels in their early to mid-twenties. Which professional officer had they been plucked from Europe and deposited in the American wilderness would have achieved more? The answer, I would argue, is none.

Washington faced daunting challenges in the 1754 campaign. An unexpected leadership role, untrained men, disgruntled officers, chronic shortages of food and supplies, rugged terrain, a vague understanding of his mission (especially after the Jumonville skirmish), lack of clear guidance from, and a remoteness to, his higher headquarters and Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie, an experienced and skilled enemy and many others. Yet the young officer accomplished a great deal. He moved his force over the mountains and into the wilderness, he built a road where one had not existed previously, he had made decisions when they were thrust upon him, he had looked out for the welfare of his officers and men where he could, he had built a defensive position that even his experienced adversary had remarked on admirably and he had led men gallantly in combat. He had begun to become a combat leader and had learned important lessons that would serve him the rest of his life. To truly understand what happened at Fort Necessity, and whether Washington performed well, it is necessary to consider the conditions he faced. All the obstacles, limitations and issues he labored under. He had been asked to do something that had never before even been attempted in the history of British America; to lead a British military force over the mountains and into the wilderness of the Ohio Valley. When all these things are considered and the young Virginian’s performance is reevaluated, can he not, at least grudgingly, be given the benefit of the doubt? Although he had most certainly stumbled on his first step onto the world stage at Jumonville Glen Washington recovered well. His performance under the stresses of combat leadership during the rest of the 1754 campaign had proven he had some military merit and the ability and character to lead men in battle. Those traits, and his experience at Fort Necessity in 1754, would be the foundational building blocks of the titanic career that was to follow.

Bland, Humphrey. A Treatise of Military Discipline, 7th Edition (London, T&T Longman, 1753).

Brock, R.A., ed. The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758 (Richmond, VA: Virginia Historical Society, 1883).

Cleland, Hugh, ed. George Washington in the Ohio Valley (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955).

Fitzpatrick, John C., ed. The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, Volume I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1931).

Kent, Donald H., ed. George Washington’s Journal for 1754 (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical Association, 1952).

Pleydell, J. C. An Essay on Field Fortification, Intended Principally for the Use of Officers of Infantry (London: J. Nourse, 1768).

Russell, Samuel L., ed., Coulon de Villers: An Elite Military Family of New France (Savanah, GA: Russell Martial Research, 2018).

Secondary Sources Alberts, Robert C. The Most Extraordinary Adventures of Major Robert Stobo (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965). Chandler, David. The Art of War in the Age of Marlborough (New York, NY: Hippocrene Books, 1976). Harrington, J. C. New Light on Washington’s Fort Necessity (Richmond, VA: Eastern National Park and Monument Association, 1957). Houlding, J. A. Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1981). Kopperman, Paul E. "The British Army in North America and the West Indies, 1755-1783", British Military and Naval Medicine, 1600-1830 (2007). Websites “Washington’s Journey to Barbados”,” Mount Vernon.org , 2002, https://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/washingtons-youth/journey-to-barbados/. “A Glossary of Fortification Terms,” American Battlefield Trust , https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/glossary-fortification-terms. See Also “The Geometry of War: Fortification Plans from 18th Century America.” William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan . October 15, 2012. https://clements.umich.edu/exhibit/geometry-of-war/. “Building and Attacking Redoubts.” Journal of the American Revolution . June 24, 2015. https://allthingsliberty.com/2015/06/building-and-attacking-redoubts/.

Capitulation accordée par de Vill D'infant Commandant des troupes de Sa Majesté tres Chrétienne a celuy des troupes Anglais actuellement dans le fort de Nécessité qui avoit été Construit sur les terres du Domaine Du Roy Ce 3e Juillet 1754 a huit heures du soir.

Capitulation granted by Mons. De Villier, Captain of infantry and commander of troops of his most Christian Majesty, to those English troops actually in the fort of Necessity which was built on the lands of the King's dominions July the 3rd, at eight o'clock at night, 1754.

Comme notre intention n'a jamais été de troubler la Paix et la Bonne armonie qui régnoit entre les deux Princes amis, mais seulement de venger L'assasin qui a été fait sur un de nos officier porteur d'une sommation et sur son escorte, comme aussy d'empecher aucun Etablissement sur les terres du Roy mon maitre A Ces Considerations nous voulons bien accorder grace a tous les Anglois qui sont dans le dit fort aux conditions ci-après.

As our intention had never been to trouble the peace and good harmony which reigns between the two friendly princes, but only to revenge the assassination which has been done on one of our officers, bearer of a summons, upon his party, as also to hinder any establishment on the lands of the dominions of the King, my master. Upon these considerations, we are willing to grant protection of favor, to all the English that are in the said fort, upon conditions hereafter mentioned.

Nous accordons au Commandant Anglois de se retirer avec toute sa Garnison pour s'en Retourner paisiblement dans son pays et luy promettons d'Empecher qu'il luy soit fait aucune insulte par nos françois, et de maintenir autant qu'il sera en notre pouvoir tous les sauvages qui sont avec nous.

We grant the English commander to retire with all garrisons, to return peaceably into his own country, and we promise to hinder his receiving any insult from us French, and to restrain as much as shall be in our power the Savages that are with us.

Il luy sera permis de sortir d'emporter tout ce qui leur appartiendra a l'Exception de L'Artillerie que nous nous reservons

He shall be permitted to withdraw and to take with him whatever belongs to them except the artillery, which we reserve for ourselves.

Que nous leur accordons les honneurs de la guerre qu'ils sortiront tambour battant avec une piece de petit Canon, voulant bien par la leur prouver que nous les traittons en amis.

We grant them the honors of war; they shall come out with drums beating, and with a small piece of cannon, wishing to show by this means that we treat them as friends.

As soon as these Articles are signed by both parties they shall take down the English flag.

Que demain a la pointe du jour un détachement françois ira pour faire défiler la Garnison et prendre pocession du dit fort.

Tomorrow at daybreak a detachment of French shall receive the surrender of the garrison and take possession of the aforesaid fort.

Que comme les Anglois n'ont presque plus de chevaux ni Boeufs, ils seront libres de mettre leurs effets en cache pour venir les charcher lorsqu'ils auront Rejoint des Chevaux; ils pourront a cette fin y laisser des gardiens en tel nombre qu'ils voudront aux conditions qu'ils donneront parole d'honneur de ne plus travailler a aucun Etablissement dans ce lieu icy ni en deça la hauteur des terres pendant une année a compter de ce jour.

Since the English have scarcely any horses or oxen lift, they shall be allowed to hide their property, in order that they may return to seek for it after they shall have recovered their horses; for this purpose they shall be permitted to leave such number of troops as guards as they may think proper, under this condition that they give their word of honor that they will work on no establishment either in the surrounding country or beyond the Highlands during one year beginning from this day.

Que comme les Anglois ont en leur pouvoir un officier, deux Cadets et Généralement les prisonniers qu'ils nous ont faits dans l'assasinat du Sr de Jumonville, et qu'ils promettent de les renvoyer avec Sauve garde jusqu'au fort Duquesne situé sur la Belle Rivière, et que pour sûreté de cet article ainsi que de ce traitté. Mrs Jacob Vannebramme et Robert Stobo tous deux Capitaines, nous seront Remis en ôtage jusqu'a l'arrivée de nos Canadien et françois ci dessus mentionnés. Nous nous obligeons de notre coté a donner escorte pour Remener en sureté les deux officiers qui nous promettent nos françois dans deux mois et demi pour le plus tard

Since the English have in their power an officer and two cadets, and, in general all the prisoners whom they took when assassinated Sieur de Jumonville they now promise to send them with an escort to Fort Duquesne, situated on Belle River, and to secure the safe performance of this treaty article, as was as of the treaty, Messrs. Jacob Van Braam and Robert Stobo, both Captains shall be delivered to us as hostages until the arrival of our French and Canadians herein before mentioned. We on our part declare that we shall give an escort to send back in safety the two officers who promise us our French in two months and a half at the latest.

Fort Necessity is not a typical military fort. It is small and simple, even for a wilderness fort. It consists a small storage shed in the center of a round stockade. The stockade is 53 feet in diameter. Earthworks were constructed outside the stockade.

When George Washington arrived at the Great Meadows in May, he intended to set up a camp from which to base his operations while waiting for additional militia and British regulars. After encountering and dispatching the French party led by Jumonville, Washington returned to the Great Meadows and fortified his position by building a stockade and earthworks around his storehouse. When he built the fort there were only 160 men with Washington. During the battle, there were 400 British at Fort Necessity. The original fort was destroyed by the French force that defeated Washington at the Battle of the Great Meadows on July 3, 1754.

For a long time, only low ridges and shallow depressions marked the site of the fort. These depressions were thought to mark the perimeter of the stockade wall. The ridges did not form a complete enclosure. It was thought some of the ridges had washed away in floods. For over a century experts had debated whether Fort Necessity was triangular or diamond shaped. In 1901 a careful study of the site revealed that the ridges formed a diamond shape.

When Fort Necessity was established as a National Battlefield in 1931, archaeology was conducted to determine the location of the stockade. The archaeological investigation in 1931 provided the basis for reconstructing the fort on the original site in 1932.

Some fragments of stockade posts were unearthed near the depressions. This made some people more sure that the ridges and depressions were the remnants of the fort stockade. As a result, the 1932 reconstruction was a large diamond shaped stockade. This reconstruction was seriously flawed but was interpreted to the public as correct.

In 1952 and 1953 the Archaeologists looking for evidence of a triangular fort and entrenchments found something surprising. The fort was neither a diamond or a triangle, but a circle. These explorations revealed the true size, shape and location of Fort Necessity, providing the basis for the accurate reconstruction visitors see today.

The information and illustrations on this page come from J. C. Harrington's historic archeology report, New Light on Washington's Fort Necessity .

The Fort Necessity Story The confrontation at Fort Necessity in the summer of 1754 was the prelude to the war fought by England and France for control of the North American continent. The struggle was known in North America as the French and Indian War and spread around the world as the Seven Years' War. It ended in 1763 with the removal of French power from North America and India. The action at Fort Necessity was also the first major event in the military career of George Washington. It was the only time he ever surrendered to an enemy.

The National Road By early in the 19th century, the wilderness of the Ohio country had given way to settlement. The road Washington cut through the forest was replaced by the National Road. The road passed by Fort Necessity and bustled with traffic heading from port to plains and plains to port.

The Mount Washington Tavern was built near Fort Necessity as a stagecoach stop on the National Road. Today it is a museum dealing with life along the Road.

Learn about the Fort Necessity campaign, the National Road and other stories.

Explore the places within Fort Necessity National Battlefield visitors can visit and enjoy.

This is the place to find biographies of interesting people who contributed to the history of Fort Necessity National Battlefield.

A day-hiker enjoys the view overlooking Fort Necessity as he walks on the park trails. A visit to Fort Necessity includes a walk to the reconstructed fort in the Great Meadow. The fort is about 300 yards from the visitor center. Talks, tours, and historic weapons demonstrations are offered in the meadow near Fort Necessity during the summer months. Five miles of hiking trails lead through forest and meadows around Fort Necessity. Cross-country skiing is available in winter. The trails are not groomed. Trails lead through forest and meadows around Fort Necessity. There is also a loop trail at Jumonville Glen and a short walking path at Braddock's Grave. There are no trails from the fort to either Braddock's grave or Jumonville Glen. At the Braddock Grave Unit, outdoor exhibits explain the ill-fated Braddock Campaign of 1755. A trace of the Braddock Road is clearly visible at this site. A monument marks the final resting place of British General Edward Braddock. Open in the winter months weather permitting. Jumonville Glen, approximately eight miles from Fort Necessity, is the site of Washington's first encounter with the French. A half-mile loop trail leads from the parking lot to the glen. A natural rock outcropping marks the site of the skirmish. Interpretive signs help visitors understand the event. Jumonville Glen is open from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. during the summer months only. Closed November 1st through April 30th.